Slants and Pommiebashers – Trademarking Slurs in Australia and US

Early last week the US Patent and Trademark Office registered a trademark for a band called “The Slants” six years to the day after it was applied for.

The Asian-American band from Washington state attempted to trademark their name but was refused on the basis that it was offensive. The Government argued that even though they have no right to limit private speech, registering a trademark is government speech so they can regulate their own speech within breaching the first amendment.

The Supreme Court in Matel v Tam unanimously decided along classic first amendment lines that even though the policy did not “play favorites”, limiting any speech was not permissible and that trademarks are an expression of private speech.

Our cases use the term “viewpoint” discrimination in a broad sense, and in that sense, the disparagement clause discriminates on the bases of “viewpoint.” To be sure, the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups. It applies equally to marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of every possible issue. It denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group. But in the sense relevant here, that is viewpoint discrimination: Giving offense is a viewpoint.

We have said time and again that “the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969). See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”)

The decision makes it unlikely that other trademarks that may be considered “offensive” will not likely face the chopping block anytime soon; well-known recent examples such as the Washington Redskins.

Redskins

 

Australian Perspectives – Nucking Futs

Australian Intellectual Property law is not quite so lenient. There are the protections under s 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) to make unlawful any act if:

(a)  the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people; and

(b)  the act is done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the other person or of some or all of the people in the group.

But as best as I could tell this has never been applied to prevent registration of a patent or trademark. Instead, we have s 42(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), which states that a trademark application will be rejected if “the trade mark contains or consists of scandalous matter“. “Scandalous” is not defined in the act or the associated regulations.

The Australian Trade Marks Office will determine, on a case-by-case basis, guided by:

  • the actual words or images applied for;
  • the intended market for the relevant goods and services; and
  • the level of acceptance of the terms within the general population.

Overt imagery or words will be considered scandalous but mere suggestion will not be sufficient. Words or images that are too similar to offensive content will also be scandalous.

  • Nucking Futs = Acceptable
  • Pommiebasher = Acceptable
  • Farkoff = Acceptable
  • Cunce = Acceptable
  • Kunt = Unacceptable

Out of these three, “Pommiebasher” was the most controversial as the trademark office considered whether the term was a form of racial vilification. Eventually, they decided that the term was “ordinary and acceptable, if colourful and colloquial, language”.

It may surprise many to know that Australians have no explicit right to free speech. Scandalous may be a high threshold but it errs on the side of allowing speech (trademarks) that may be crude or in poor taste but stops short of anything that is a bit too far beyond the pale.

Review: Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts; Cases and Materials

Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts; Cases and Materials by Peter Radan, Cameron Stewart and Illija Vickovich (3rd Ed)

Principle of Australian Equity and Trusts is another must-have reference book for generalists and specialists alike. Principles of Equity and Trusts is presented in an easily approachable and digestable manner that will assist any practitioner in correctly and quickly identifying the relevant issues.

Like many similar reference books, this book is a wealth of knowledge for assisting practitioners find the most relevant and pertinent case law.

As the most recent version of Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts, the 3rd edition contains the latest case law and commentary on the development of the laws of equity and trusts in Australia. This includes extensive commentary on landmark cases such as Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 392 concerning a finding of unconscionable conduct by a casino for taking advantage of a person’s “special disadvantage”, namely a crippling gambling addiction.

International cases are also included in the breakdowns, particularly monitoring the development in similar jurisdictions and particularly the UK, Singapore and New Zealand. Cases such as FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2015] AC 250 bringing the UK in line with most other common law jurisdictions finding that bribes received are rightly held on trust for the principal.

Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts does exactly what it promises and delivers a great resource for principles and cases on the current position of equities and trusts.

Partnership Obligations Surviving Retirement

Partnerships are an odd form of association. All of your debts and fortunes are your partners and vice versa. It should certainly be enough to give anyone pause before accepting to enter into a partnership with someone.

But partners retire, relationships go sour and people hit hard times. So what obligations, duties and also entitlements survive termination? Taking a leaf out of Buzzfeed’s books, let me tell you that the answer may surprise you.

A situation recently arose where a retiring partner refused to sign documents that would have put the partnerships affairs in order. The retiring partner was claiming an entitlement but refused to acknowledge any surviving duties. Putting aside the operation of any partnership deed, which will usually include some sort of duty of good faith (even though this is implied in law), it may be instructive to assess the law as abstract from any specific circumstances.

bluwa

Partner’s Duties

Partners are required to act in a manner just and faithful towards one another, including a duty to produce due and fair accounts, more on this later. (Lindley & Banks on Partnership 19th Ed. (2010) pp 234-5.) Further to this, they must act in a manner that is in the utmost good faith and in accordance with their fiduciary duty. (Lindley & Banks, pp552-561; Bean Fiduciary Obligations & Joint Ventures (1995) p 143 and pp185- 196)

Upon retirement, the Partnership Act 1963 (ACT) provides in statute with section 21(3):

“A partner who retires from a firm other than an incorporated limited partnership does not by that retirement alone stop being liable for the firm’s debts and obligations incurred before the partner’s retirement.”

Also at section 44 that:

(1) After the dissolution of a partnership, the authority of each partner to bind the firm and the other rights and obligations of the partners continue, despite the dissolution, so far as necessary to wind up the affairs of the firm or to complete transactions started but unfinished at the time the partnership is dissolved, but not otherwise.

Turnbull & Abbott

Case Law

The answer to the titular question is essentially twofold: the obligations survive as far as is necessary to give a full accounting and wind up the partnership, and (linked to the first branch) a partner is restricted from taking advantage of a benefit that arose under the partnership and therefore should have been included in the accounting.

Chan v Zacharia 154 CLR 178 is the seminal case and concerns a partner who refused to sign a lease renewal on behalf of the partnerships so that he could take personal advantage of it.

  1. “… After the dissolution, the obligations of the partners continued so far as was necessary to wind up the affairs of the partnership…In those circumstances the obligation of “perfect fairness and good faith” which is owed by one partner to another continued: see Lindley on Partnership 14th ed. (1979), at p 430. 

each of the former partners owes the same obligation to the other former partner in respect of that interest as he did while the leasehold interest remained the partnership property …”. That statement is, in my respectful opinion, correct if it is understood to be limited to the case of a partnership which has not been completely wound up…”

This was further approved in John Nelson Developments Pty Ltd v Focus National Developments Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 150 in which a partner was determined to not only not take benefit (sorry for the double negative) but actively take positive steps to  “to finalise their obligations by working out ‘who owed what to whom’” [313]

Chan further at [21]:

“The relationship between the partners was curtailed and altered by the dissolution of the partnership. It did not however cease. In particular, and with the exception of the “goodwill” of the practice, each doctor, by reason of his position as a former partner, remained under fiduciary obligations in respect of the partnership property which was to be realized [sic] and applied in paying or discharging partnership debts and liabilities and the expenses of and incidental to the winding up of the partnership affairs…Notwithstanding the dissolution of the partnership, “the good faith and honourable conduct due” from each partner to the other persisted for the purposes of winding up the affairs of the partnership and each partner remained under a fiduciary obligation to co-operate in and act consistently with the agreed procedure for the realization [sic], application and distribution of partnership property”

This position has been affirmed in the Territory primarily in Re Ravinder Rohini Pty Ltd and Janak Raj Sharma v Ivan Krizaic [1991] FCA 318 and also notably in another High Court decision United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1986) 157 CLR 1. 

It should also be noted that the same duties can be inferred into joint ventures and other situations where fiduciary obligations can be implied.

So what does that mean?

Well, it means that once a partner retires, he must still act as though he is in the partnership until such a time as a full accounting is taken and distributed of all aspects of the partnership.

This duty extends to taking proactive steps to avoid losses caused to the partnerships through your actions or omissions and alternatively your partners owe you the same duty; to effectively and efficiently do everything they can to secure the release of the retiring partner.

Death?

The same. Section 38 of the Partnership Act, provides that the death of a partner will be treated the same as any other form of dissolution. The same rights of the partner to be paid for their share accrue to their estate.

Debts are a little more complicated, but essentially they operate in the same way except that the debts of the dead partner owing to the partnership must take second priority to any other personal debts directly owing from the dead partner’s estate. [section 13]